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Abstract 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Danish hearing aid producer, Oticon became 
world famous for its radical empowerment and delegation experiment, 
popularly called the ”spaghetti organization.”  Recent work has interpreted 
the spaghetti experiment as a radical attempt to foster dynamic capabilities 
by imposing structural ambiguity on the organization (Lovas and Ghoshal 
2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000).  However, this 
work has neglected that about a decade later, many of the more radical 
elements of the spaghetti organization have been left.  This paper presents 
an organizational economics interpretation of the spaghetti organization 
and its subsequent transformation. In such an interpretation, the spaghetti 
organization imposed significant organizational costs that could be 
tolerated as long as the benefits produced by the spaghetti organization 
dominated the costs.  One source of organizational costs that the paper 
focuses on turn on the potential contradiction involved in combining a 
strong manager who possesses ultimate decision rights with widespread 
delegation.  Apparently, Oticon management failed to solve, or didn’t even 
realize the nature of, the resulting commitment problem. A number of 
implications are developed, particularly with respect to the firm-market 
dichotomy.  
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Introduction 
The ongoing restructuring of organizational forms as a response to changes in 
fundamental drivers such as IT, measurement methods, internationalization, the 
increased emphasis on shareholder value and new strategic conceptions has 
become a topic of strong academic as well as managerial interest.   Thus, firms, 
particular those in “knowledge-intensive industries,” are argued to increasingly 
adopt ”network organization” (Miles and Snow 1992) and engage in ”corporate 
disaggregation” (Zenger and Hesterly 1997), so as to become ”information age 
organizations” (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999).   
 From a theoretical point of view, an underlying message in much recent 
literature on new organizational forms is that mechanisms for coordinating 
activities are much more malleable than what is conventionally assumed in, 
notably, organizational economics (e.g., Coase 1937; Williamson 1996).1  Thus, to a 
large extent, some of these new organizational forms may be seen as a matter of 
introducing mechanisms that (to the economist) are predominantly characteristic 
of the market ⎯ for example, high-powered incentives, direct competition over 
resources, flexibility, etc ⎯ into hierarchical organization (Jensen and Meckling 
1992; Jensen and Wruck 1994).  Conversely, other new organizational forms 
represent an infusion of market exchange with characteristics of firm-like 
coordination mechanisms, such as information exchange, relations of trust, partial 
exercise of authority, etc. (e.g., Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  Thus, to the extent that 
new organizational forms represent new ways of combining mechanisms that 
have traditionally been seen as characteric of governance structures that are polar 
opposites, they instantiate the supposedly fading boundaries between markets 
and firms (Hodgson 1998).  
Empirical investigation in the form of rich, qualitative methods for data 
collection may be argued to be a precondition for research on new organizational 
forms because of the relative novelty of the phenomenon of new organizational 
forms.  However, much of the literature on new organizational forms is already 
characterized by more or less explicit theorizing, as well as criticism of existing 
theory.  Thus, there are aspects of the recent literature on new organizational 
forms that are open to direct theoretical objections.  One of these is a tendency to 
put all the emphasis on the benefit aspects of experimenting with new 
organizational forms to the exclusion of the cost aspects.2   
 In contrast, the present paper is taken up directly with these cost aspects.  
Thus, it is argued that far from coordination mechanisms being completely 
malleable ⎯ that is, combinable at will ⎯ mixing mechanisms that are 
characteristic of market organization with principles that are characteristic of firm 
                                                 
1 This is forcefully argued in Grandori (2000).  
2 This is exemplified and discussed in Mahnke (2001). 
 2
organization may lead to inefficiencies stemming from misaligned incentives.3  
Such inefficiencies may represent an important, and largely neglected, source of 
the costs of experimenting with new organizational forms.    
The inefficiencies that the present paper focuses on relate to experiments 
with internal organization, in particular to attempts to introduce market-like 
coordination mechanisms ⎯ such as high-powered incentives, various bidding-
schemes, self-organizing project groups, competing “molecular” units, etc. ⎯  
into their internal organization.  Such “internal corporate disaggregation” (Zenger 
and Hesterly 1997) is arguably an important subset of the set of new 
organizational forms.  The literature on internal transfer prices has revealed the 
existence of various incentive problems that may beset this organizational 
practice (Eccles 1986; Holmström and Tirole 1991).  However, the specific source 
of inefficiencies that this paper focuses on is different.  Thus, the emphasis is on 
commitment problems related to the delegation of decision rights in firms. It is 
argued that there is a fundamental problem that firms confront when they try to 
mimick the market in terms of implementing widespread delegation of decision 
rights in firms.  The problem is caused by delegated decision rights in firms being 
ultimately always loaned from the holder(s) of ultimate decision-making rights, 
namely the top-management and the owners.  The problem for top-management 
and/or owners then is to commit to real delegation (Aghion and Tirole 1997; 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999, 2000).  
In the ensuing, the problems of mimicking market organization in the 
context of the internal organization of a firm is discussed with reference to 
changes in decision-making processes and administrative systems (i.e., the 
organization of task division) that took place in the Danish electronics (primarily, 
hearing aids) company, Oticon A/S, starting in 1991.  Oticon became world-
famous for its radical delegation and empowerment experiment ⎯ appropriately 
and aptly marketed as the ”spaghetti organization” ⎯, and for the speed and 
radicality with which then CEO, Lars Kolind managed to accomplish a major 
organizational turn-around, particularly in the corporate 
headquarters/development parts of the Oticon organization.  Oticon seemed, and 
seems, to be an embodiment of the pure project-based organization and an 
outstanding example of achieving integration and recombination of knowledge 
by means of loosely coupled administrative systems.   In fact, a recent cottage 
industry has treated the Oticon spaghetti organization as an outstanding 
exemplar of change management (being generously cited by Tom Peters 1992), 
business process re-engineering (Obolensky 1994), and visionary leadership and 
strong corporate culture (Yamashita 1998), and more specifically as an successful 
example of strategy making as “guided evolution” (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000), or 
well designed “structural ambiguity” (Ravasi and Verona 2000), or the cultivation 
                                                 
3 To be sure, it can be done ⎯ hybrid forms in a broad sense are clearly viable governance 
structures for many types of economic activities ⎯ but at other times the respective principles 
collide, imposing severe inefficiencies on the relevant governance structure. 
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of “organizational capabilities for continuous innovation” (Verona and Ravasi 
1999).4
 The present paper differs from these contributions.  While not denying that 
the spaghetti organization may indeed have caused a degree of innovativeness 
that might not have been obtainable in its absence, the emphasis is rather on the 
neglected cost side of the spaghetti exercise, and in particular on the incentive 
problems alluded to above.5   This is not only matter of better understanding the 
relevant trade-offs associated with the adoption of a particular new organizational 
form.  It is also a matter of understanding the dynamics of new organizational 
forms.  The spaghetti organization continues to be taken as an outstanding 
examplar of the benefits of a project-based organization that goes beyond the 
matrix structure and carries internal disaggregation to an extreme (e.g., Lovas and 
Ghoshal 2000; Ravasi and Verona 2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999).  However, the 
spaghetti organization in the form described even in the most recent scholarship 
(idem.) does not exist anymore in Oticon ⎯ it has been superceded by more 
structured administrative systems.  The question why this change has taken place 
will be addressed in the following. 
 The purpose of the ensuing is to develop a different interpretation of the 
spaghetti organization ⎯ one that is inspired by organizational economics ⎯, and 
to provide some understanding of the causes of the partial abandonment of the 
spaghetti organization that has taken place at Oticon since about 1996.  Note that 
although the interpretation developed here differs from those presented in recent 
academic work on Oticon (notably Lovas and Ghoshal 2000; Ravasi and Verona 
2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999), it does not necessarily contradict these 
contributions (“The Spaghetti Organization: Simulating the Market in Oticon”).  It is 
thus quite conceivable that although the spaghetti organization in some ways was 
an attempt to implement an inherently unstable administrative system, this 
system was in fact necessary to realize the benefits of increased innovativeness.  
However, I am directing attention to the cost side of the spaghetti experiment and 
to the possibility that the cost aspects may have to dominate the benefit aspects, 
necessitating a change of administrative systems (“Spaghetti and Beyond: Some 
Problems of Bringing Markets Into Hierarchies”).6  I further argue that the story of the 
                                                 
4 The Oticon case is reported to be the best selling IMD case ever (Børsens Nyhedsmagasin 8. 
november 1999). Kolind’s dramatic and symbol-laden way of implementing the Oticon spaghetti 
structure as well as the structure (or, perhaps, non-structure) itself are still being given extensive 
treatment in management textbooks (e.g., Boddy and Paton 1998). 
5 Characteristically, the title of Ravasi and Verona’s (2000) study of Oticon is ”Organizing the 
Process of Knowledge Integration: the Benefits of Structural Ambiguity” (my emphasis).  There is 
nothing about the cost side of imposing loosely coupled administrative systems on an 
organization in their paper. 
6 Thus, while recent studies of Oticon put most of the emphasis on dynamic efficiency (i.e., the 
spaghetti organization as a means of fostering dynamic capabilities), the present paper put more 
of an emphasis on static efficiency.  However, both considerations are necessary for getting a full 
picture of efficient  organizational design (Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa 1993).   
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Oticon spaghetti experiment suggests important lessons about the limits to 
delegating rights within a firm when the CEO and other top-managers in 
actuality keep ultimate decision rights (“Discussion: Implications for Economic 
Organization”).  In turn, this carries implications for the basic and important issue 
of the firm-market choice (“Conclusion”). 
A Note on Method 
Basic Method 
 A basic problem of undertaking research into the Oticon spaghetti 
experiment is that very few of those who were employed when the experiment 
was implemented in the beginning of the 1990s are still with the Oticon 
organization, and the rest are extremely hard to locate.  Therefore, I decided to 
mainly rely on archival sources, newspaper articles, and, in particular, the large 
number of very rich and thick descriptions of Oticon that have been produced by 
a number of mainly Danish scholars, journalists and Oticon insiders throughout 
the 1990s (in particular, Lyregaard 1993; Poulsen 1993; Morsing 1995; 
Søndergaard and Døjbak 1997; Morsing and Eiberg 1998 Eskerod 1997, 1998).7   
 Thus, the approach followed with respect to understanding the nature of the 
spaghetti experiment was more that of the historian than that of the qualitative 
researcher trying to understand recent phenomena or ongoing change.  Thus, the 
emphasis was more on evaluating, comparing and integrating written statements 
relating to past events than on performing the same operations on oral accounts 
relating to contemporary or ongoing events.  This is a defensible research 
strategy, because the aim was not necessarily to uncover hitherto unknown data 
relating to Oticon.  Rather, the aim was to develop a different interpretation of 
already existing and very rich data, and discuss implications of this 
interpretation.  
 However, the prime mover behind the spaghetti experiment, then-CEO, Lars 
Kolind, was interviewed (June 2000) about a number of specific issues that were 
not adequately treated in the existing material.  He also commented upon earlier 
drafts of this paper.  Also, the Oticon HRM officer was interviewed in a three 
hours, in-depth interview (June 2000).  The interview mainly focused on the 
nature of recent changes in administrative systems in Oticon.  A subsequent 
follow-up was conducted to clarify details.  
The Nature of the Inquiry 
 It is necessary to reiterate a methodological point already alluded to. Much 
of the following represents an attempt to pursue as far as possible one specific 
                                                 
7 Actually, these are so rich that even very recent studies of Oticon, based on a large number of 
interviews, such as Ravasi and Verona (2000) and Verona and Ravasi (1999) add rather in terms of 
descriptive detail.  
 5
interpretation of one specific aspect of the Oticon spaghetti experiment ⎯ namely, an 
organizational economics interpretation of the organizational costs that this 
experiment imposed on Oticon ⎯, examine why it was partially abandoned, and 
tentatively draw some general conclusions from this.  Organizational economics 
per se is hardly in an early stage of theory development anymore, given that early 
work goes back more than six decades (Coase 1937) and the last three decades 
have witnessed a flurry of work in this field.  There is therefore little need for 
following a logic of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  However, a main 
purpose of conducting analysis of single cases is to be able to pose competing 
explanations for the same set of events (and perhaps to indicate how these 
explanations may be applied to other situations) (Yin 1989).  Allison (1971) is the 
outstanding exemplar here.  Moreover, basic considerations of internal validity 
dictate that alternative explanations be considered.8  
 However, while I shall indeed make reference to other possible explanations 
of the relevant events, the main emphasis is on developing the specific 
interpretation.  While an eclectic, multiple perspective approach may be superior 
in the abstract, more insight may arguably be provided in the concrete by 
relatively narrowly pursuing one specific interpretation.  In addition, an adequate 
multi-perspective account of the spaghetti experiment would require at least a 
book-length study.  Finally, it warrants repetition that the present account should 
not be thought of as contradicting existing accounts; rather, it directs attention to 
a hitherto neglected interpretation of important aspects of the Oticon spaghetti 
experiment.  
The Spaghetti Organization:  
Simulating the Market in Oticon  
This section describes the Oticon spaghetti experiment as an example of internal 
corporate disaggregation.  While agreeing that the spaghetti experiment may 
indeed be understood both in terms of a conscious attempt to introduce loose 
coupling through structural ambiguity (Weick 1976) in the design of the 
organization (Ravasi and Verona 2000) or as an instance of “guided evolution” 
(Lovas and Ghoshal 2000), the section develops a complementary organizational 
economics interpretation.  In this interpretation, the spaghetti experiment may be 
understood as an attempt to “simulate the market” in the internal organization of 
Oticon.    
Disaggregation as a Contemporary Business Practice 
There is accumulating empirical evidence that firm sizes have been falling 
worldwide during the last two decades as firms have engaged in downsizing, 
spin-off and outsourcing exercises (Zenger and Hesterly 1997).   Thus, established 
                                                 
8 Cf. Rumelt’s (1996) discussion of the famous Honda case. 
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firms have increasingly left activities to the ”market,” meaning other (often new) 
firms. Fundamental advances in IT and measurement technologies have 
facilitated these changes, while equally fundamental developments in the 
organization and motives of capital markets as well as increasing internalization 
have made them necessary. Cutting size, spinning off business units, etc. reduce 
coordination costs, improve incentives, and help to clarify the nature of the 
businesses the firm is in.  Improvements in entrepreneurial capabilities as well as 
a better ability to produce, share and re-produce knowledge often result (Grant 
1996; Day and Wendler 1998).    
However, firms may be able to reach these goals in a different way ⎯ albeit 
one that to some extent also relies on market (-like) forces ⎯ namely by 
disaggregating internal organization (internal disaggregation) rather than 
disaggregating the corporation itself (external disaggregation). A number of 
contemporary management practices, notably TQM (Jensen and Wruck 1994) and 
knowledge management techniques (Mahnke 2001), are basically internal 
disaggregation devices. From a short-run perspective, internal disaggregation 
practices may have the benefit of involving fewer lay-offs relative to external 
disaggregation.  Moreover, spin-offs, carve-outs and the like are often legally 
quite complex operations, whereas internal disaggregation exercises are matters 
of fiat, and may therefore be attractive alternatives in terms of ink costs expended 
on corporate lawyers.9  Further, management may entertain the fear that leaving 
too many activities in the hands of other firms may lead to a hollowing out of the 
corporation in the longer run (Teece et al. 1994).  Relatedly, considerations of 
protecting valuable knowledge may enter the picture (Liebeskind 1996).  
When presented in this way, one may wonder why firms should ever 
disaggregate externally: The two alternative means of disaggregation appear to be  
imperfect substitutes and external disaggregation would seem to be both more 
painful (e.g., in terms of employee dissatisfaction), more costly (e.g., in terms of 
lawyer bills), and more risky (e.g., in terms of the risk of losing valuable 
knowledge).  However, internal disaggregation also has its distinctive problems.  
In the interpretation adopted here, the spaghetti experiment in Oticon illustrates 
some of these problems.10  In order to get an understanding of this, we first need 
to get a grasp of how internal disaggregation was carried out at Oticon.  
                                                 
9 On the related idea that there are fundamental legal differences between organizing transactions 
inside the firm versus organizing across markets, see Williamson (1996). 
10 In terms of the distinction between external and internal corporate disaggregation (Zenger and 
Hesterly 1997), Oticon relied mostly on internal disaggregation.  The possibility of strengthening 
incentives by relying on the real market (rather than the simulated internal one) by spinning off 
functions and departments does not appear to have been seen as a serious alternative to internal 
disaggregation.  The production of some ”discount” (i.e., inexpensive, low-tech) hearing aids were 
in fact spun-off (with Oticon maintaining financial control over the spin-off), but this was clearly 
an exception to the rule, and the company remains strongly vertically integrated to this day.  For 
example, many of the machines used in the production plant in Thisted, DK, are actually 
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Oticon: Background 
Founded in 1904 and based mainly in Denmark, Oticon (now William 
Demant Holding A/S) is a world leader in the hearings aids industry.11  For a 
number of years in the beginning to the mid-1990s, Oticon became one of the best-
known and admired examples of radical organizational turnaround. The 
turnaround aimed at reaching the complementary goals of increasing employee 
empowerment and responsibility, reducing product develoment cycles, 
increasing contact to customers, mobilizing dispersed and “hidden” existing 
knowledge, and building new knowledge, all contributing to the explicitly stated 
strategic intent of achieving world dominance on the hearing aids market (Lovas 
and Ghoshal 2000). Oticon CEO Lars Kolind, the architect of the spaghetti 
organization turnaround, became a favorite of the press and management 
scholars alike.  In many respects, the strong publicity received by the spaghetti 
experiment was completely justified.   
First, the experiment embodied a large number of those non-traditional 
management practices that were gaining currency at that time.  It was seen and 
marketed as an embodiment of loose coupling, project-based organization and 
empowerment driven to their extremes.  Second, although other firms adopted 
similar disintegration exercises and had done so earlier, the turnaround in Oticon 
was remarkable for the speed with which it took place. Third, the spaghetti 
organization delivered the goods. This, it very quickly demonstrated its 
innovative potential by re-vitalizing important, but “forgotten” projects, that, 
when implemented in the production of new hearing aids, produced significant 
financial results, essentially saving the firm from a threathening bankruptcy, and 
by turning out a number of new strong products.  The background to all this was 
the following one.  
From being the world leader in the late 1970s at a 15 % market share in 1979 
and with subsidiaries in West Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands, the 
United States, Norway, Switzerland, France, and Italy, that position was lost in 
less than a decade.  By the end of 1987, market share had fallen to 7%.  The results 
were massive financial problems.   A rather direct cause of the fall in market share 
was the introduction in 1987 by the US firm, Starkey of a new hearing aid that 
was considerably more sophisticated than any existing Oticon product.  More 
generally, the technological paradigm (Dosi 1982) in the hearing aids industry 
was gradually changing through the 1980s from “behind-the-ear” hearing aids to 
“in-the-ear” hearing aids (Lotz 1998).  Moreover, digital signaling processing was 
appearing as an important technology that would completely overturn 
                                                                                                                                                   
produced in a special department in the headquarters in Hellerup. Although a number of 
potential suppliers are available, management questions their ability to deliver the right quality.   
11 See Lotz (1998) for a careful analysis of the hearing aid industry, with particular emphasis on 
patterns of innovation. The history of Oticon prior to the introduction of the spaghetti 
organization is covered in, for example, Poulsen (1993) and  Lomas and Ghoshal (2000: 877-878). 
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productive processes in the industry.  Oticon management had to realize that in 
an industry where the race to bring the next technologically sophisticated product 
to the market was fast becoming the competitive criterion, the competition had 
leapfrogged Oticon in terms of technological developments and in terms of 
reducing the time length of product development.  Oticon was left behind.   
However, realizing this took time and was painful; acting on the realization was 
apparently even more painful.   
On all accounts (Poulsen 1993; Morsing 1995; Foss and Hertz 2000), Oticon 
was locked into a competence trap that was reinforced by strong groupthink 
(Janis 1983), characterizing both the management team and the employees.  A 
symptom of this was that around 1980, the dominant opionin among managers 
and people in development at Oticon was that the in-the-ear hearing aid would 
turn out to be a commercial fiasco.  At any rate, in-the-ear hearing aids weren’t 
Oticon turf (Poulsen 1993).  The self-image of the company clearly was one of 
being a traditional industrial company with massive production facilities 
specialized in mass-producing the behind-the-ear hearing aids and developing 
that technology incrementally.  The dominant ethos in the company was one 
defined by engineering people, not by marketing people; technology, not 
customers, was central.  Administrative systems were organized traditionally 
with functional departments, the managers of which together constituted the 
senior executive group.  
When problems began to accumulate, various attempts were made to 
change the situation; however, they were either too insignificant and incremental 
or didn’t survive political jockeying inside Oticon.12  The executive team had been 
in control of Oticon for just about thirty years. It was the same team who had 
taken the company to a number one position in the world market in the late 
1970s. As a consequence of the mounting difficulties, the team collectively 
stepped down from their positions in 1989.  The new CEO became Lars Kolind.  
Holding degrees in mathematics and management, an important part of his 
background was the international scout movement. It is perhaps telling that 
Kolind was particularly impressed by the ability of that movement to organize 
and coordinate in an efficient, flexible and rapid manner large-scale gatherings 
(e.g., international jamborees), not as a result of detailed management but rather 
as a consequence of a strong and shared set of values.  
Upon assuming his new job in 1989, Kolind basically concentrated all 
decision-making powers in his hands; for example, virtually all expenses, even 
trivial ones, had to be approved of by him.  He used this centralization of power 
to cut costs dramatically.  However, in a paradoxical way, he combined almost 
                                                 
12 For example, the executive of the international division launched a campaign to renew Oticons 
image, called the” Partner Project.” The idea was to create a close relationship with hearing care 
professionals all over the world, and to try to get a better idea of the customers’ needs in this way.  
The project was killed when the three of the four senior executives did not support it (Poulsen 
1993).   
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dictatorial concentration of power with a great open’ness and with great 
communicative skills.  For example, the rather drastic cost-cutting measures were 
very openly communicated, and their necessity carefully explained.  About a year 
after assuming his position, Kolind realized that the cost-cutting measures, which 
had almost immediately improved the company’s financial situation, had been 
fully exploited.  Although the measures were necessary and yielded substantial 
financial results, they were only short-term measures.  They were inadequate to 
cope with the tremendous changes that were underway with respect to products 
and processes in the industry and which were prompted by changing preferences 
on the part of customers towards more advanced and aestetically pleasing 
designs and changing technologies (i.e., the application of digital signal 
processing technologies). Something more radical was needed with respect to the 
strategic orientation of the firm and the administrative systems that could back 
this up ⎯ trying it was made possible by the accumulation of substantial slack 
resources which the cost-cutting exercise had produced.  
Trying Spaghetti 
That “something” was sketched in a 6 pages memo, presented to Oticon 
employees on April 18, 1990 under the heading, “Think the Unthinkable” (Kolind 
1990).  The objective of the vision embodied in the memo was to create an increase 
in profitability by 30% over the next three years.  This required a change of 
corporate vision and mission: The company should be defined broadly as a first-
class service firm with products developed and fitted individually for customers, 
rather than narrowly, as a manufacturing company producing traditional high-
quality standard behind-the-ear hearing aids.  Customer orientation should be 
key.  In order to meet these objectives, the document sketched a complete 
overhaul of the Oticon organization.  Kolind baptized the new organization the 
“spaghetti organization,”in order to emphasize the point that the new 
organization should be able to change rapidly, yet still possess coherence.  The 
new administrative structure should be explicitly “knowledge-based” (Kolind 
1990) and “anthropocentric,” yet based on “free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993).  
It should therefore be capable of combining and re-combining skills in a flexible 
manner where skills and other resources would move to those (new) uses where 
they were most highly valued, with only minimal intervention on the part of 
Kolind and other managers being required to secure this aim.   
The new administrative structure was primarily to be implemented in the 
Oticon headquarters (i.e., administration, research and development and 
marketing), although various aspects of the spaghetti-organization were also 
implemented in the production plant in Thisted (DK) and in various sales offices 
outside of Denmark.  In order to symbolically underscore the fundamental 
transformation of Oticon, the company headquarters moved, at 8 am on 8 August 
1991, to a completely new location in Hellerup just north of Copenhagen.  All of 
the furniture of the old headquarters was auctioned off.  In the new building, all 
desks were placed in huge, open office spaces.  Employees were not supposed to 
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be permanently located at particular desks, but should move flexibly from desk to 
desk, bringing only a trolley with necessary paper with them.  Inside a huge glass 
tube, placed in the lobby of the company headquarters, a steady stream of paper 
fell down, emphasizing the ambition to run the headquarters in a virtually paper-
less way.  Finally, all formal titles were done away with.   
Symbolism clearly loomed large, but the innovations with respect to the 
design of office space, etc. were quite functional in supporting the fundamental 
changes in administrative structure that the spaghetti organization implemented 
in the Oticon headquarters. Thus, the huge, open office landscape constituted the 
physical infrastructure of an almost completely flat organization that was 
supposed to work by means of principles that were explicitly designed to emulate 
the functioning of a market system (Lyregaard 1993.  
The new organization consisted in breaking down the old functional 
department-based organization into an almost completely flat, almost 100 percent 
project-based organization.  Departments gave way to “competence centers” (e.g., 
in mechanical engineering, audiology, etc.) that broke with the boundaries 
imposed by the old departments.  And rather than being assigned tasks from the 
above, employees now had a choice to decide which projects they would join.  All 
projects were to be announced on an electronic bulletin board, where employees 
who would like to join them could sign in.  The much noted “multi-job” principle 
meant, first, that employees were not restricted in the number of projects they 
could, and, second, that employees were actively encouraged (and in the 
beginning actually required) to develop and include skills outside their skill 
portfolio.  
Each project would hold employees with different skills coming from 
development, marketing and the production units.  Project managers were free to 
manage the project, as he or she preferred, “management” being understood 
more in terms of playing the role of facilitator and coordinator than that of a 
directing principal.   The project team was required to undertake all the tasks 
connected with product development until the product was successfully 
introduced in all markets.  
 To make it possible for project teams to rapidly combine the right skills, the 
new organization was founded on four fundamental ideas.  First, as already 
noted, the traditional functional department structure was eliminated. Instead, all 
activities were now supposed to be organized by projects.  The philosophy behind 
this was not only to make it easier to combine complementary skills on projects, 
but also to eliminate department-specific group-think, a problem that had 
plagued the old organization.  Second, new information technology systems were 
designed and implemented to make it possible to coordinate plans and actions in 
such a decentralized organization. The aim was to create a firm-wide information 
flow, increasing employee understanding of company activities and making it 
easier for project teams to form.  Moreover, the information-dissemination policy 
also helped to break knowledge-monopolies left over from the old organization, 
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although this does not appear to have been an explicit aim.13 Everybody was 
supposed to have full access to the same information. Third, in a move called the 
“breakdown of the palace,” the traditional office was abandoned.  No one would 
have private offices or fixed desks; instead, all employees were located in one 
large office.  At each desk there was a workstation, including a cellular phone and 
a computer with access to all information on the Oticon network.  The employees’ 
physical locations changed according to the projects they worked on.  Coffee bars 
were strategically located around the building to stimulate and encourage 
discussion, and a central spiral staircase that was wide enough to permit chance 
encounters and dialogue, replaced the elevators in the building.  Finally, Kolind 
worked hard to develop and install a value base that stressed responsibility, 
personal development, freedom, understanding, growth, partnership and safety.  
These fundamental organizing principles were backed up by other 
measures.  For example, Kolind introduced an employee stock program, which 
was motivated by the need to raise needed additional money for the 
transformation.   Kolind invested 26 millions DKK of his own funds in Oticon.  
Project managers throughout the organization received a considerable amount of 
decision making power.  Wage negotiations were decentralized. The project 
managers ⎯ that is, those managers who were supposed to possess the most 
intimate knowledge of employee skills and efforts ⎯ received the right to 
negotiate salaries.  Finally, although project teams were self-organizing and 
basically left to mind their own business once their projects were ratified, they 
were still to meet with a ”Project and Product Committee” once every three 
months for ongoing project evaluation.  
One of the things soon to be realized when the spaghetti organization 
became a reality was that Oticon actually already had almost fully developed an 
in-the-ear hearing aid back in 1979.  As one employee said: ”We had created a 
good structure with five people – each with their own area of responsibility I was 
responsible for the ear plug. But at that time the organization simply wasn’t 
functioning.  No-one really believed in it and there was no support” (Foss and 
Hertz 2000).  A result of the spaghetti organization was that work on the old in-
the-ear hearing aid could be resumed.  Yet another positive outcome of the 
spaghetti organization was that the development time of new products became 
half of what it used to be. Thus, typical time-to-market was reduced to three 
years. Customer orientation, another explicit aim of the spaghetti, also 
dramatically improved.  In 1993, half of Oticon’s sales stemmed from products 
introduced in 1993, 1992 and 1991.  A total of 15 new products had been 
introduced since the introduction of the new organization.  Moreover, the 
ambition to broaden the business areas of Oticon was successful; it was 
characteristic of the new products that they were not just hearing-aid hardware, 
                                                 
13 One of the means towards the end of creating a truly knowledge-based company was Kolind’s 
dictate of a “no paper” policy.  In principle, every document had to be scanned into a computer, 
filed there, and then being maculated, the goal being an elimination of 95% of all paper. 
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but complete integrated hearing solutions, many of them drawing upon recent 
advances in digital signaling processing technology and embodying sophisticated 
software.  
  The two major innovations that are usually directly ascribed to the increase 
in innovative capability that the spaghetti organization fostered are MultiFocus 
from 1992 and DigiFocus from 1996.14  Both represented strong technological 
discontinuities, the former by being the first hearing aid that adjusted tonal 
balance and amplification in a fully automatic way, the latter by being the very 
first fully digital hearing aid ever.  The technological trajectories defined by these 
two major product innovations yielded a number of more incremental products in 
the following years. 
 A recurring theme in academic treatments of the Oticon spaghetti 
organization (Morsing 1995; Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000) is 
that an important reason for the strong increase in Oticon’s innovativeness is 
ultimately rooted in imposing a condition of loose coupling (Weick 1976) on the 
organization and that loose coupling is achieved by introducing structural 
ambiguity.  Thus, the breaking down of authority and roles accomplished by 
means of introducing a radical project-organization amounts to a condition of 
structural ambiguity.  In turn, this condition facilitated efficient and speedy 
integration and production of knowledge, leading to “… the undisputed ability 
for continuous innovation displayed by Oticon” (Ravasi and Verona 2000: 31).  
While not disagreeing with this interpretation per se, the following section 
presents an alternative interpretation, based on organizational economics.  This 
interpretation directs attention to other aspects of the spaghetti organization.  
Moreover, as well shall see, it may help to understand why the spaghetti 
organization has had to be modified (a fact that has not been noted in recent work 
on Oticon).  
 
The Spaghetti Organization: An Organizational Economics Interpretation 
From an organizational economics point of view, the immediately noticeable 
aspect of the spaghetti organization is the importance of the market metaphor in 
the design of the new administrative structure.15  And a sort of market it 
seemingly was. Employees (particularly project leaders) were given many and 
quite far-reaching decision-making rights. Development projects could be 
initiated by, in principle, any employee just like entrepreneurs in a market setting, 
although these projects had to pass, not the market test, but the test of receiving 
approval from the Project and Product Committee.  Project groups were self-
                                                 
14 Today, MultiFocus is described by Oticon insiders as the product that saved the company from 
the bankruptcy that would have been threatening in the somewhat longer run.  
15  It was used quite explicitly by Oticon insiders (e.g., Lyregaard 1993). 
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organizing in much the same way as a partnership is self-organizing.  The setting 
of salaries was decentralized to project leaders. Most hierarchical levels were 
eliminated and formal titles done away with, etc.  Thus, the intention was that the 
organization should mimic the market in such dimensions as flexibility, 
autonomy, flatness, etc.   
Now, the decentralized market is made coherent ⎯ that is, individual 
decisions and plans are coordinated ⎯ by means of the price mechanism, various 
contractual institutions and norms and mores. In lieu of a distinct price 
mechanism, the market-like spaghetti organization was to be kept together by a 
shared set of values, advanced information technology, the charismatic leadership 
of Lars Kolind, and, last but certainly not least, by a committee, staffed by Kolind 
and three other managers, the primary purpose of which was to approve of or 
reject proposed projects.  Kolind’s explicit aim was to build an administrative 
system that was superior to any other conceivable system with respect to 
discovering, building and combining knowledge.  In a number of ways, the 
spaghetti organization did fulfill this aim, and certainly was much superior to the 
old organization in this respect.  
A major problem that besets centralized decision-making systems ⎯ in large 
firms as well as in centralized economies ⎯ is that they have difficulties 
efficiently mobilizing and utilizing important local knowledge, such as the precise 
characteristics of specific processes, employees, machines or customer 
preferences.  As Hayek (1945) explained, the main problem is that much of this 
knowledge is transitory, fleeting and/or tacit, and therefore costly to articulate 
and transfer to a (corporate) center.16 Markets are not plagued by these type 
problems to the same extent.  Rather than involving the transfer of costly-to-
transfer knowledge to those with decision rights (as in a command economy or a 
centralized firm), markets tend to economize on the costs of transferring 
knowledge by instead moving decision rights to those who possess the relevant 
knowledge (Hayek 1945; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Jensen and Wruck 1994).  In 
the process, markets ensure that, at least as a broad tendency, rights to make use 
of resources will move towards those who put the highest valuation on these 
rights.  Moreover, because people interacting under market conditions are 
residual claimants on their own actions, effective use will be made of those rights.  
The Oticon spaghetti organization was very much an attempt to mimic the 
market in these dimensions.  Thus, a basic problem in the old organization had 
been that commercially important knowledge simply didn’t reach the relevant 
decision-makers.  A reflection of this is the example, mentioned earlier, of Oticon 
employees already having invented the in-the-ear hearing aid, that invention 
basically being shelved and forgotten until the spaghetti organization recovered 
it.  By giving project teams extensive decision rights, making ideas for projects 
                                                 
16 Group think may exacerbate these problems, that is, make it even more costly to transfer 
knowledge to those who are supposed to make decisions based on this knowledge (Janis 1983). 
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public and requiring that teams/project groups possessed the necessary  
complementary skills for a particular marketing, research or development task, 
the spaghetti organization stimulated a co-location of decision rights with local 
knowledge.  Those who held the relevant knowledge should also have the 
authority to decide over the use of company resources, at least within limits.  
 It is, of course, much the same co-location that places in a well-functioning 
market.  However, the analogy is not complete. Oticon remained a firm.  And 
firms confront a problem that markets confront to a smaller degree, namely that 
of making sure that decision rights are utilized efficiently, in other words, the 
problem of moral hazard.  There was no apriori guarantee that project leaders and 
other employees would act in the interest of Oticon (and Oticon’s owners). 
Several of the components of the spaghetti organization may be seen as responses 
to this fundamental agency problem.   
It is convenient to break the right to allocate resources to a particular project 
down into groups of decision-making rights, namely rights to 1) initiate a project, 
2) ratify projects, 3) implement projects, and 4) monitor and evaluate projects (cf. 
Fama and Jensen 1983).  Decision-making processes in project-based firms rest on 
the allocation and exercise of such rights.  Thus, how these rights are allocated 
and exercised have profound implications for the efficiency with which decision-
making processes take place and for the outcomes of these processes.  For reasons 
of efficiency, firms usually don’t concentrate these rights in the same hands; 
rather initiation and implementation rights may be controlled by one person (or 
team) while ratification and monitoring rights are controlled by other persons, 
usually hierarchical superiors.17   
As noted above, this sort of allocation of control rights corresponds to that of 
the Oticon spaghetti organization.  Thus, anybody could make initiate a project, in 
the sense of sketching, making preliminary plans, doing the required calculations, 
making contacts, etc.  However, projects had to be evaluated by the Products and 
Projects Committee that was staffed by Kolind, the development manager, the 
marketing manager and the support manager.  The Project and Products 
Committee either rejected or approved of the project.  Although the ex ante criteria 
for getting a project accepted by the Committee were not that harsh or 
encompassing ⎯ projects basically only had to somehow relate to the business 
areas of Oticon and to yield a positive return over a three years period and with a 
discount rate of 30 % ⎯ the Project and Products Committee was the real holder 
of power in Oticon.  Frequent intervention on the part of the Committee ex post 
made that clear to everybody.  Thus, projects were required to report to the 
Committee on a three months basis, and the Committee could at any time halt or 
close down projects (something which happened quite frequently).  Thus, 
                                                 
17  Exceptions may occur when giving subordinates more extensive rights (e.g., a package of 
initiation, ratification and implementation rights) strengthens employee incentives (see Aghion 
and Tirole 1997 and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999 for analyses of this).  
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decision management (i.e., initiation and daily project management) was very 
strongly separated from decision control (i.e., project evalution and monitoring).  
In other words, the internal market was, in actuality, very much a steered one.  
Although a considerable amount of variety was indeed allowed to evolve, the 
selection over this variety was very much guided by the visible hand of the 
Products and Projects Committee. 
  From an organizational economics perspective, another notable (though 
hitherto unnoticed) feature of the spaghetti organization is the extent to which it 
was characterized by complementary elements, that is, organizational practices that 
formed an interlocking system, feeding on each other (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 
Baron and Kreps 1999).  Thus, widespread delegation of rights was accompanied 
by making incentive systems and employee monitoring much more fine-grained 
than they had been under pre-spaghetti administrative system.  Thus, much 
wider dispersal of wages were allowed for, employee stock ownership was 
strongly encouraged, and employees were monitored by an elaborate system of 
evaluation, where their performance in 3-8 different dimensions (depending on 
the type of employee) was examined (Poulsen 1993).  
The fact that these organizational practices constituted a complementary 
system also helps accounting for the speed and toughness with which Kolind 
managed the transition from the old organization (also made up of 
complementary, yet different organizational practices) to the new system.  It may 
be argued that transition had to be accomplished in a ”big bang” manner (cf. 
Dewatripont and Roland 1995); complementary systems are very hard to change 
efficiently in an incremental manner (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  In particular, 
vested interests, the efforts of rent-seekers who try to defend established 
priveleges, etc. may make transition hard.  In the context of the implementation of 
the spaghetti organization, Kolind implemented it in a big-bang manner so as to 
effectively break old commitments, make life hard for those held power positions 
in the old organization, and create new organizational expectations.  The change 
was clearly assisted by the symbolic acts undertaken by Kolind.  More precisely, 
these helped to signal his commitment to the change.  For example, Kolind’s 26 
million Dkr investment was such an act of commitment (Hermalin 1998). His 
attempt to infuse the organization with a strong set of shared values may also be 
seen as a an attempt to assist the coordination of multiple efforts in a 
decentralized setting while simultaneously keeping agency problems at bay 
(Miller 1992; Kreps 1990).   
Not only was the implementation of the spaghetti organization consistent 
with basic organizational economics principles, the organization itself in many 
ways conform to what may would be prescribed by these principle.  For example, 
Kolind rightly separated decision-management (the project teams) from project 
control (the Product and Project Committee) (Fama and Jensen 1983), worked 
hard on developing a corporate value base, and made employees residual 
claimants through the employee stock schemes, all of which may be seen as 
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responses to latent agency problems introduced by the strong delegation of 
decision rights that characterized the spaghetti organization. 
Thus, apparently Kolind did exactly what basic organizational economics 
reasoning would instruct him to do.  However, the spaghetti organization as 
described in the above is no longer a completely valid description of the 
administrative systems characterizing Oticon.  Although Oticon headquarters is 
still by any reasonable standard an organization characterized by much 
delegation of decision rights, there has decidedly been a retreat from the  
spaghetti organization to more structured administrative systems.  
 
Spaghetti and Beyond: Some Problems of Bringing 
Markets into Hierarchies 
Particularly after 1995, Oticon began to abandon the spaghetti organization in the 
form that has been described in the above.  What happened ⎯ and why?  The 
argument in the following is that just as organizational economics provides an 
interpretation of hitherto neglected aspects of the spaghetti organization, this 
body of theory is also helpful for understanding the recent changes in the 
spaghetti organization. 
Retreating From Spaghetti  
The retreat from the radical spaghetti organization that Kolind had 
implemented in 1991 began long before he resigned as CEO in 1998.  In 1996, 
Oticon headquarters were essentially been divided into three “business teams,” 
called “Team Advanced,” “Team Technology,” and “Team High Volume.”    
These serve as a new administrative layer relative to the original spaghetti 
organization, and function as overall administrative units around projects.  Each 
business team is managed by two team leaders, namely a technician and a person 
with marketing or human resource skills.  These teams refer directly to Niels 
Jakobsen, the new CEO.  
  In addition to the business teams, a “Competence Centre”has been defined. 
The unit is in charge of all projects and their financing and of an operational 
group controlling administration, IT, logistics, sales and exports. The competence 
centre is led by the chief HRM manager, Henrik Holck and comprises nine 
managers. The competence centre is one of the successors to the Project and 
Products Committee, but its style of managing the projects is very different. In 
particular, the utmost care is taken to avoid the erratic behavior with respect to 
intervening in already approved of projects that characterized the Products and 
Projects Committee.  The team leaders and the head of the Competence Centre 
comprise, together with the CEO, the “Development Group,” which may be seen 
as the second successor to the Products and Projects Committee of the original 
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spaghetti organization.   The Development Group, which essentially is the senior 
executive group, is in charge of overall strategy making. 
Most of the initiative with respect to starting new projects is taken by the 
Development Group, although the need for employees to provide inputs in the 
form of new project ideas is still strongly stressed.   Many of the decision-making 
rights held earlier by project leaders have now been concentrated in the hands of 
the competence centre or individual managers.  For example, project leaders 
rights to negotiate salaries have been constrained.  Project leaders are appointed 
by the competence centre; the right to be a project leader is not something that one 
grabs, as under the spaghetti organization.  Although multi-jobs/multi-tasking 
are still allowed, they are not directly encouraged, and their prevalence has been 
much reduced.  The norm is to work on only one project at a time.  The electronic 
job bourse where anybody in the old spaghetti organization could advertise 
projects and seek co-workers, but which never worked satisfactorily, has been 
finally dropped.  
 To sum up, recent changes of administrative systems at Oticon, beginning 
around 1996 and after the major innovations of MultiFocus and DigiFocus, have 
amounted to a break with the almost complete bottom-up approach that 
characterized the original spaghetti structure.  Much of the initiative with respect 
to product development efforts now comes from particularly the Competence 
Centre. More hierarchical layers have been introduced, and a number of the 
decision rights that were decentralized under the spaghetti organization have 
now concentrated in the Development Group and the Competence Centre.  Thus, 
although Oticon remains in all relevant dimensions an unusually relaxed and 
“empowered” organization, many of the crucial elements of the spaghetti 
organization have been left.    What happened?  
Some Possible Causes of the Partial Failure of the Spaghetti Experiment 
A perspective informed by organizational economics suggests that although 
the spaghetti organization was characterized by substantial coherence obtaining 
between its constitutive elements, it was still beset by a number of problems that 
may arguably have been among the causes of its partial abandonment about five 
years later.   Some of these are rather obvious, while some are more subtle.  It is 
convenient to group them into problems of assigning the right people to the jobs, 
managerial competence, multi-tasking, coordination,  knowledge-sharing, and 
influence activities.18   
                                                 
18  A further cause of the retreat from the spaghetti has to do with the fact Lars Kolind became 
increasingly involved in managing acquired subsidiary companies.  He had to increasingly 
delegate control over the headquarters to other members of the management team.  Much of the 
”glue” of the spaghetti organization may have consisted in the unique communicative and 
leadership skills of Kolind.  However, Kolind himself maintains that the spaghetti concept was 
basically appropriate (correspondence with the author, 20 June 2000).  
 18
 With respect to assignment, the spaghetti organization was still populated by 
a number of employees whose mindset and competencies were characteristic of, 
and therefore made them sympathetic towards, the old way of doing things, that 
is, Oticon prior to the implementation of the spaghetti organization.   Aligning 
tasks with such people in the new organization was inherently difficult, and some 
of these people were basically idle or engaged in political fights that essentially 
destroyed value.  These problems may have been aggravated by the fact that the 
spaghetti organization had done away with most hierachical levels, leading to a 
problem of the allocation of managerial competence.  Competent and incompetent 
people were placed on the same level, having the same basic right to initiate 
projects and getting a hearing before the Projects and Products Committee.   
Thus, hierarchy couldn’t be used anymore as a sorting mechanism for 
arranging skills so that those with more decisive knowledge would obtain 
authority over those with less decisive knowledge (Casson 1994).   In fact, the 
very notion that hierarchy may reflect such an ordering of knowledge ran pretty  
much counter to the basic bottom-up philosophy that animated the spaghetti 
organization (Kolind 1990).  From an incentive, the extremely flat spaghetti 
organization implied sacrificing an incentive instrument: Hierarchical job ladders 
couldn’t any longer function as incentive mechanisms in their own rights, since 
the spaghetti organization essentially abolished conventional tournaments 
between managers.  
As mentioned earlier, a key ingredient of the spaghetti organization was the 
notion of “multi-jobs” where each employee was encouraged to not engage in a 
broader set of tasks than he had under the old organization but also to develop 
skills that were outside his present skill portfolio.  The written material on Oticon 
does suggest that the multi-job principle actually helped to stimulate knowledge 
exchange and integration, primarily because it allowed employees to participate 
in more than one project at a time.   However, the material is more silent on the 
considerable problems that multi-jobs, or multi-tasking, tended to produce for the 
organization.19  Under the spaghetti organization, one could in principle join any 
number of projects one wanted to.  There were no regulations relating to this, and 
nobody kept track of the total spent on the projects one had joined.  Moreover, 
project leaders were free to try to attract those who worked on competing 
projects, and in many cases they succeeded in doing  so.  This was a consequence 
of the explicit to emulate the market, but the effect that it was hard to commit 
people to projects.  This led to severe coordination problems, because project 
leaders had very little guarantee that they could actually carry a project to its end, 
given that anybody at the project could leave at will, if noticing a superior 
opportunity in the internal job market.  Moreover, many joined more projects 
                                                 
19 Eskerod (1997, 1998) is the exception.  My later interview with the chief HRM officer strongly 
confirmed Eskerod’s finding that the multi-job principle had rather severe costs in terms of 
problems of coordination and frustrating employees.  
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than their time resources possibly allowed for, creating problems of coordinating 
schedules and work hours.  
The key idea behind the spaghetti organization was to foster an 
administrative system that was far superior to the old one (and to any other 
conceivable system) in discovering, building and utilizing knowledge.   Although 
this may have been partly achieved, the cost side of relying on a simulated market 
for accomplishing these goals was the stated intentions of making Oticon a 
knowledge-sharing environment were frustrated.  Rather than freely exchanging 
knowledge with everybody else, knowledge tended to be held back within 
projects, because of the widespread, and correct, perception that projects were 
essentially in competition over resources.  By stressing so strongly a market-like 
competitive ethos and by making incentive systems more “high-powered” 
(Williamson 1996) than they had been under the old organization, the spaghetti 
organization to some extent worked against its stated purposes. Monitoring 
systems apparently couldn’t cope satisfactorily with these problems.20
Finally, influence activities seems to have been important under the 
spaghetti organization.  These denote those activities inside an organization that 
aim at influencing hierarchical superiors to make decisions that are in one’s 
interest rather than in the organization’s (Milgrom 1988; Schaefer 1998; Argyres 
and Mui 2000).  Resources expended on influence activities are, from the point of 
view of the organization, waste.  The spaghetti organization which amounted to 
creating competition between project groups for the approval of the only 
“hierarchical superior” left, namely the Projects and Products Committee, 
arguably produced such influence activities.  Personal relations to those who 
staffed the Committee became paramount for having a project ratified by the 
Committee.  It is, however, not clear from the material on Oticon that this was 
perceived as a serious problem in the organization, for example, it resulted in 
obviously unimportant projects being approved of by the Committee.  Another 
problem in the spaghetti organization that may have been more serious and 
which may have been the cause of its ultimate demise receives, however, more 
support in the material.   I turn to this next. 
The Inherent Difficulties of ”Playing Market” 
  As the Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises (1949: 709) explained, there 
are inherent contradictions involved in ”playing market.”  With reference to 
various socialist schemes of his day that tried to preserve some market relations 
while eliminating capital and financial markets, Mises argued that these schemes 
would be unworkable.  Importantly, the concentration of ultimate decision-
making rights and responsibilities, and therefore ownership, in the hands of a 
central planning board would dilute the incentives of managers.  Thus, while 
                                                 
20  Possibly as a reflection of these problems, the most crucial variable with respect to determining 
salary changes in the present organization is the degree to which an employee contributes to 
knowledge-sharing. 
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planning authorities could (and according to the schemes of the day, should) 
delegate rights to make production and investment decisions to managers, these 
rights were likely to be used inefficiently.  First, since managers couldn’t be sure 
that they would not be overruled by the planning authorities, they were not likely 
to take a long view, notably in their investment decisions.  Moreover, since 
managers were not the ultimate owners, they were not the full residual claimants 
of their decisions and, hence, wouldn’t make efficient decisions.   Therefore, Mises 
declared, the attempt to ”play market” under socialism would only lead to 
inefficiencies  .  
As later research has clarified, the problem may be handled if the planning 
authorities can credibly commit to a non-interference policy.  However, doing so 
may be very hard, since reneging on a promise to delegate will in many cases be 
extremely tempting and those to whom rights are delegated anticipate this.  
Transaction cost economist, Oliver Williamson (1996) has referred to these kinds 
of problems with his concept of the ”impossibility of (efficient) selective 
intervention.”  He describes it as  
… a variant on the theme, “Why aren’t more degrees of freedom always 
better than less?.” In the context of firm and market organization, the 
puzzle is, “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of 
small firms can and more.” By merely replicating the market the firm 
can do no worse than the market.  And if the firm can intervene 
selectively (namely, intervene always but only when expected net gains 
can be projected), then the firm will sometimes do better.  Taken 
together, the firm will do at least as well as, and will sometimes do 
better than, the market (1996:150).  
Williamson flatly argues that selection intervention is ”impossible.” The main 
problem is that incentives are diluted.   This is because the option to intervene ”… 
can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected net gains) and for bad 
(to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 150-151).  Promises 
to only intervene for good cause can never be credible, Williamson argues, 
because they are unenforcable. However, his conclusion that ”selective 
intervention” is strictly impossible may not be entirely correct.  It is in fact 
conceivable that the intervenor may credibly commit to not intervene in such a 
way that the ”subgoals of the intervenor” are promoted.  
 The logic may be stated in the following way (cf. Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy 1999).  Assume that a subordinate initiates a project.21  Assume further 
that the manager has information that is necessary to perform an assessment of the 
project, but that he decides upfront to ratify any project that the subordinate 
proposes.  Effectively, this amounts to full informal delegation of the rights to 
initiate and ratify projects  ⎯ ”informal,” because the formal right to ratify is still 
                                                 
21  This should be understood in a broad sense: A “project” may refer to many different types of 
decisions or clusters of decisions. 
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in the hands of the manager and because that right cannot be allocated to the 
subordinate through a court-enforceable contract (cf. Williamson 1996).   Because 
the subordinate values being given freedom, this will induce more effort in 
searching for new projects (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss and Foss 2000).  The 
expected benefits of these increased efforts may overwhelm the expected costs 
from bad projects that the manager has to ratify.  However, the problem is that 
because the manager has information about the state of a project (”bad” or 
”good”), he may be tempted to renege on a promise to delegate decision authority, 
that is, intervene in a “selective” manner.  But if he overrules the subordinate, the 
latter will lose trust in him, holding back on effort.  Clearly, in this game a number 
of equilibria are feasible   What determines the particular equilibrium that will 
emerge is the discount rate of the manager, the specific trigger strategy followed 
by the sub-ordinate (e.g., will he lose trust in the manager for all future periods if 
he is overruled?), and how much the manager values his reputation for not 
reneging relative to the benefits of reneging on a bad project (for details and 
extensions, see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).    
Selective Intervention in Oticon 
It is arguable that one of the reasons why the spaghetti organization was 
changed into a more hierarchical, but still essentially project-based, organization 
is to do with the sort of problems described by notions of selective intervention 
and the related problems.   Thus, the official rhetorics of a flexible market-based 
administrative system with substantial autonomy and the management team (i.e., 
the Projects and Products Committee) as little more than facilitator and 
coordinator (Lyregaard 1993), was increasingly odds with the frequent selective 
intervention on the part of the Projects and Products Committee.  That this modus 
operandi led to diluted incentives and a general state of de-motivation is strongly 
suggested by the case material (particularly Eskerod 1997, 1998).  
 Thus, the frequent intervention and changing priorities of Kolind and the 
Products and Projects Committee caused mounting frustration among employees. 
This frustration finally resulted in a major office meeting in 1995, announced as 
“take shots at top management.”  This meeting marks the beginning of the retreat 
from the pure spaghetti organization. On that meeting employees dramatically 
expressed their concerns about the gap between the Oticon value base, and the 
way the company was actually run. To some extent, wage issues appears to have 
been involved: Many employees apparently felt that the emphasis of Oticon 
remuneration schemes was too much on intrinsic motivation and too little on 
extrinsic (pecuniary) motivation.  But it was also a matter of frustration that 
projects were interrupted in seemingly arbitrary ways and that the organization 
was far better at generating projects than at completing them. 
 The present Oticon organization is characterized by a much more consistent 
approach towards projects on the part of the Competence Centre (one of the 
descendants of the Products and Projects Committee). Organizational 
expectations appear to be that priorities do not change in the rapid and erratic 
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manner that characterized the original spaghetti organization, and that employees 
can be much more sure that the projects they are working on are taken all the way 
to the end.   In the new organization, projects are rarely stopped or abandoned, 
and there is a stated policy of sticking to ratified projects.  To reasons are given for 
this:  First, projects now rests on generally more secure ground, having been more 
carefully researched beforehand.   An aspect of this is that the Competence Centre 
now much more actively puts forward projects ideas, contact potential project 
leaders, etc., instead of relying on the almost complete bottom-up approach that 
characterized the original spaghetti organization.   Second, the wish to avoid 
harming motivation (diluting incentives) by overruling going projects is stressed. 
Apparently, present management of Oticon has been able to credibly commit to a 
policy of non-interference with going projects.   If the present analysis is correct, 
one of the main problems of the old spaghetti organization was that Kolind and  
the Products and Projects Committee never committed in this way; neither, 
apparently, did they intend to do so.  Their view may have been that in important 
respects and in many situations, they were likely to possess decisive knowledge, 
and that efficient resource-use dictated intervening in, and sometimes closing 
down, projects.  However, that view clashed on a basic level with the rhetorics of 
widespread delegation of decision rights.  
 
Discussion: Implications for Economic Organization 
The purpose of the present section is to tease out some possible implications and 
wider ramifications for the understanding of economic organization from the 
Oticon spaghetti organization and from those theoretical building blocks that 
have been applied to the interpretation of that administrative system.   In 
particular, what does the case, as well as the theory that has been used to develop 
the specific interpretation of the case, suggest about the possibilities of applying 
principles that are characteristic of markets inside of firms?    
Remediable Design Mistakes? 
 In order to discuss possible implications of the spaghetti experiment, some 
other possible interpretations must first be treated.  The story that has been told in 
the preceding pages essentially is that the original, almost completely flat 
spaghetti structure foundered on, first, its market-like character working against 
its stated purpose of building, integrating and sharing knowledge, and, second, 
the contradiction involved in combining widespread delegation of decision-rights 
with a frequently intervening top-management team in the form of the Products 
and Projects Committee.  A possible implication is that Oticon adopted a too 
market-like mode of internal organization.  However, the obvious counter-
argument is that although Oticon may have made mistakes in the design of the 
spaghetti organization, these mistakes were essentially remediable.   And if that is 
the case, one cannot necessarily infer that Oticon adopted a too market-like mode 
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of internal organization.  The reverse may in fact be true: The spaghetti 
organization wasn’t sufficiently market-like.22
 It should be granted that many of that many of the problems that beset the 
spaghetti organization were indeed remediable design mistakes.  The problem, 
however, is whether they were really remediable in the context of the spaghetti 
organization.  
 For example, the problems of multi-tasking/multi-jobs may have been 
reduced by simply prohibiting employees from working on more than, say, 2 
projects that couldn’t add up to more than 100 % of the employee’s total work 
hours.  In fact, the more structured project organization gradually implemented 
from 1996 has established controls that secure that the coordination and time-
allocation problems that beset the original spaghetti organization are kept at bay.   
Establishing such controls in the original spaghetti organization would, however, 
have run against the official rhetorics of autonomy and delegation.  Monitoring 
systems might have been refined to control more dimensions of employee 
behavior; etc. However, the very elaborate monitoring system that was 
implemented together with the spaghetti organization and involved the 
construction of objective measures on half a dozen aspects of employee behavior 
(Poulsen 1993) appears to have been tacitly shelved and substituted with a 
simpler system that relied more on subjective performance assessment.  This 
suggests that the problem with monitoring systems under the original spaghetti 
organization was that they were already too complex.  
 Since behavior was apparently difficult to measure, a more output-based 
system could have been tried (Prendergast 1999).  In principle, one may imagine a 
system of contracts that specified rewards for specific accomplishments (e.g., a 
system that rewarded according to milestones in a development project).  In fact, 
this would have made the spaghetti organization even more market-like.  
However, it is doubtful whether such a contract could actually be made court-
enforceable.  Because of the resulting commitment problem, the contract system 
would have to rely on reputation effects.23  
 Even if the spaghetti organization might conceivably have dealt with such 
problems, other problems may have been harder to fight under this organization.  
For example, it is inherently difficult under an organization such as the spaghetti 
organization to protect against influence activities.  A relative advantage of the 
traditional, hierarchical and rule-governed organization is exactly that it may be 
better at protecting itself against influence activities, because what each employee 
is allowed to do and perhaps say is simply much more narrowly circumscribed 
than in an organization such as the Oticon spaghetti organization (Milgrom 
                                                 
22  Thanks to Anna Grandori for suggesting this possibility. 
23 And let us not forget that one of the advantages of internal organization is the savings on the 
costs of using the price mechanism (Coase 1937).  
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1988).24 Thus, influence activities may have been a problem, and may have been 
among those problems  that help explaining the shift away from the pure project-
based spaghetti organization to the far more managed and structured project 
organization that characterizes Oticon today. 
 Finally, provided the problems could have been dealt with, the original 
spaghetti organization might conceivably have been a viable discrete 
organizational form if Kolind and the Products and Projects Commitee could in 
fact have committed to a non-interference policy from the outset.   However, in 
the specific case of the spaghetti organization, this was hardly an option, given 
that the emphasis on organizational flexibility also was explicitly taken to imply 
that projects could be closed based on the fiat of the Projects and Products 
Committee.25  
Implications for New Organizational Forms 
 The concept of ”new organizational forms” has been increasingly utilized 
lately as a unifying label for various changes in organizational forms towards 
external and internal corporate disaggregation (Bowman and Singh 1993; Zenger 
and Hesterly 1997).  It covers both new ways of designing the boundaries of the 
firm (e.g., novel sourcing arrangements, new types of licensing agreements, 
virtual corporations, etc.) as well as new ways of designing internal organization 
(e.g., new ways of structuring the employment relation).   With respect to their 
application inside firms, proponents of the new organizational forms argue that 
their main advantages lie in the ability to integrate the virtues of more established 
organizational forms.  Specifically, they combine the ability to achieve efficiencies 
through specialization that characterizes the functional form with the relative 
independence that can be granted in an divisional form and the ability to transfer 
resources and capabilities across division and business unit boundaries that 
characterize the matrix organization (e.g., Miles and Snow 1992).   
As a number of writers have observed, these forms mix in novel ways means 
of allocating resources that are characteristic of the market with means of 
allocating resources that are characteristic of the hierarchy (Jensen and Wruck 
1994; Zenger and Hesterly 1997; Mendelsson and Pillai 1999). More generally, the 
boundaries between markets and hierarchies are blurring, as firms increasingly 
adopt high-powered incentives and as markets increasingly become infused with 
hierarchical elements, such as information exchange and relational contracting 
(Cowen and Parker 1997; Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  The ”swollen middle” 
(Hennart 1993) seems to have become the dominant mode of organizing 
                                                 
24 This is not to say that ”non-traditional” organizational forms are necessarily beset with influence 
costs.  See Argyres and Mui (2000) for an excellent analysis of how organizations may commit to 
certain rules that regulate what is acceptable discourse.  Those rules reflect a trade-off between the 
benefits of organizational learning stimulated by dissenting opinion and the costs of rent-seeking 
activities that are pursued in the organizational conversation.  
25 And, one might add, also given the personality of the CEO, Lars Kolind (Poulsen 1993).  
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transactions, so that the polar modes of elementary organizational of pure 
hierarchical planning and pure markets are increasingly seen as descriptively 
irrelevant.   The drivers of these tendencies are the increasing reliance on 
specialist knowledge, which means that the traditional employment contract is 
becoming increasingly obsolete (Hodgson 1998); the increasing importance of 
diffuse knowledge capital, the ownership of which may be far from clear, and 
which renders ownership-based definitions of the boundaries between firms and 
markets increasingly irrelevant; and the rise of knowledge-intensive industries.  
Empirically, it is probably true that, as a broad tendency, there has been an 
increasing infusion of organizing principles associated with the market in 
hierarchies, and vice versa.26  In particular, firms increasingly adopt more market-
like ways of structuring their internal organization (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999), 
often engaging in internal corporate disaggregation where traditional 
departments are broken partially down and substituted with more or less self-
organizing “molecular units” (Zenger and Hesterly 1997).   The question is 
whether these organizational forms are viable.  The analysis of the Oticon 
spaghetti experiment suggests implications for the clarification of this issue.  
 A basic proposition in much of organization theory is that for reasons of 
efficiency (or, “norms of rationality”), organizational forms are aligned with 
environmental conditions, strategies and exchange conditions in a systematic and 
discriminating manner (Thompson 1967; Williamson 1996; Nickerson and Zenger 
2000).  An implication is that mixing very different coordination mechanisms may 
lead to efficiency losses.  The present paper has provided a specific illustration of 
this problem, namely in the context of the internal disaggregation exercise taking 
place with the Oticon spaghetti organization.  It has not been argued that 
combining coordination mechanisms as in the spaghetti organization is inherently 
possible, although that it is inherently problematic.  The problem is that 
decentralizing an organization by means of dictated delegation of rights to carry 
out certain actions (hiring, training, sourcing, pricing, etc.) amounts to ”playing 
market” (Mises 1949: 709).  It can never really be market exchange, because, unlike 
independent agents in markets, corporate employees never possess ultimate 
decision rights. They are not full owners.  This means that those who possess 
ultimate decision rights can always overrule employees.  Thus, credibly 
committing to a policy of decentralization and delegation is a major problem, for 
top-management in firms as well as for governments and other rulers.   
 Arguably, such insights greatly advance the analysis of the extent to which 
coordination mechanisms may be efficiently combined, and dispels ill-founded 
ideas that such mechanisms may be combined more or less at will.  The 
theoretical implication is that although notions of “coherent” organizational 
forms, characteristic of older organization theory, may appear crude today 
(Grandori 2000), what may be needed is not discarding the basic idea that there 
                                                 
26 Although solid empirical knowledge of these trends is meager.   
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are indeed discrete organizational forms with different efficiency properties for 
certain environments, but rather a more refined analysis of the limits within 
which coordination mechanisms may be combined (idem.).   A more practical 
implication is that, if theoretically founded reasoning suggests that a certain 
organization form may be inefficient, attention may be directed to other modes of 
economic organization.  For example, external disaggregation may be a more 
viable long-term option than internal disaggregation (Day and Wendler 1998; 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999) because its incentive properties are superior. 
 Finally, it should be noted that although some of the members of the large 
and expanding set of new organizational forms may indeed be founded on 
inconsistent combinations of coordination mechanisms, the attendant losses in 
terms of increased coordination costs, misaligned incentives, etc. may be more 
than offset by gains in dynamic efficiency.27   If indeed the Oticon spaghetti 
organization was inefficient with respect to the organization of its administrative 
systems, it is hard to argue against the proposition that it was also an 
extraordinarily innovative organization.  These benefits may likely have 
overwhelmed the organizational costs.28
Conclusions 
To many firms, disaggregation is seen as an imperative (Day and Wendler 1998).  
However, disaggregation may be accomplished by means of external 
disaggregation, internal disaggregation, or some mixture between the two.  The 
present paper has examined a concrete (internal) disaggregation episode in the 
light of organizational economics. The Oticon spaghetti organization 
accomplished in a number of ways what it was intended to, notably a dramatic 
increase in sustained innovativeness.   However, it has been suggested that a 
number of inefficiencies were present in that administrative structure, which led 
to a more hierarchical and well-defined structure being adopted.   In particular, 
the attempt to “play market” in Oticon foundered on the basic problem of doing 
so.  One of the rationales of firms is exactly that they may avoid the high-powered 
incentives that characterize markets and structure monitoring and reward 
schemes in ways that are generally not available to markets (Holmström 1999).   
Arguably, the spaghetti organization was carried too far in its emulation of the 
                                                 
27  Also, in an extremely interesting paper, Nickerson and Zener (2000) suggest that considerations 
of efficiency may dictate modulating between discrete organizational forms in response to a stable 
set of environmental conditions.  This is because the steady-state functionality delivered by a 
discrete organizational form may itself be discrete, and the desired functionality may lie in 
between those delivered by the discrete organizational forms.  Efficiency gains may then be 
obtained by modulating between the forms.  
28  At least for some time.  It may be noted that the retreat from the spaghetti organization began 
when the major innovations of Oticon had been introduced, thus suggesting that organizational 
costs might have begun to overwhelm gains in terms of dynamic efficiency.  The organization has 
not yet come up with something as radical as the 1996 DigiFocus.  
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market.  Moreover, there was a basic problem of credible commitment, one that 
centered on the apparent inconsistency between a policy and rhetorics of 
widespread delegation, emphasis on responsibility, etc. on the one hand, and a 
managerial practice of shifting priorities and intervention and closing down of 
projects on the other hand.  If the interpretation in this paper is accurate, these 
were significant causes of the retreat from the spaghetti organization. 
  An overall theoretical implication of the story told in the present paper is 
that contrary to the more extreme proponents of the supposedly universal 
knowledge-based network organization (e.g., Cowen and Parker 1997), it does 
matter whether knowledge-based networks are organized within or across the 
boundaries of the firm.   
 First, incentives differ between markets and firms.  Knowledge sharing, one 
of the main stated aims of the spaghetti organization, is not necessarily best 
stimulated by market-based project organization.  To the extent that knowledge 
sharing is a hard-to-measure performance variable, employees are likely to put 
less of an emphasis on this.  Upon realizing this, resort to lower-powered 
incentives is likely (Holmström 1999).  This corresponds to what took place in 
Oticon, where it was realized that the internal market produced not only benefits 
with respect to knowledge-integration, but had certain harmful effects on 
knowledge-sharing.    
 Second, it remains the case that markets don’t rely on resource-allocation by 
means of authority whereas firms do (Coase 1937).  “Authority” is a dangerous 
word because it is easily invested with a too narrow meaning, for example, 
detailed direction and supervision.  However, authority also means setting 
boundary conditions for a relation, such as, trivially, deciding that employees of 
our firm cannot also be employees of another firm (Holmström 1999), or, less 
trivially, defining what is acceptable discourse within a firm (Argyres and Mui 
2000).    And ultimately, the meaning of being a boss is that one can restrict the 
decisions of one’s subordinate, overrule him and perhaps fire him. In turn, this 
means that although decision rights may be delegated, we can still trace the chain 
of authority in a firm, and we will always realize that ultimate decision-making 
power resides at the top.  In a sense, all subordinates’ decision rights “are loaned, 
not owned” (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999: 56).  Fundamentally, it can never 
be otherwise.  This is because ultimate decision-making rights can only be 
transferred from bosses to subordinates in one way, namely by transferring 
ownership (Hart 1995).  However, transferring ownership amounts to spinning 
off the person to whom ownership is given.  It means creating a new firm.  
 These insights suggest that there is reason to be skeptical of sweeping claims 
that economic activity, being knowledge-based and highly dependent on personal 
relations, will increasingly taking place in networks that cut across the boundaries 
of the firm, that formal authority will vanish in importance, and that firms will 
therefore merely be legal shells around knowledge-creating activities.  To be sure, 
formal authority may vanish in importance in an increasingly knowledge-based 
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economy, and certainly authority in the narrow sense of picking actions for an 
employee from a well-defined action space.  But if that is the case, this may not be 
because firms’ internal organization becomes increasingly characterized by 
delegation of rights.  Rather, it may be that the number of firms increase, because 
the only efficient way to cope with the commitment and other incentive problems 
caused by increasingly knowledgeable employees may be to spin them off, that is, 
let them create their own companies. 
 On the level of research methodology, this paper may be taken as an 
instantiation of the position that there are fruitful complementarities between 
organization theory, organization behavior and strategy approaches approaches 
on the one hand and organizational economics insights on the other hand (cf. also 
Argyres and Mui 2000; Mahnke 2001).  Thus, the spaghetti organization may 
indeed be understood in terms of an attempt to foster dynamic capabilities 
through imposing loose coupling and structural ambiguity on an organization 
(Ravasi and Verona 2000).  But from an organizational economics perspective, 
that organizational form also represented a matrix of rights and resulting 
incentives that are helpful for understanding its liabilities, and perhaps its 
dynamics.   
 Finally, on the level of managerial implications, the perhaps most important 
implication of the present analysis is to not focus in an isolated manner on a 
particular type of corporate disaggregation.  Notably, because internal 
disaggregation, at least to the extent that it emulates market organization, may be 
inherently hard to efficiently bring about, managers should always consider 
whether external disaggregation (spin-offs, outsourcing, carve-outs, etc.) may be 
efficient alternatives to internal disaggregation.  And if internal disaggregation is 
in fact chosen, the present analysis directs attention to the paramount importance 
of credibly committing to the specific form adopted and not undermine it by 
erratic selective intervention. 
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